A bi-level modelling approach is proposed to represent the interaction between the vehicle loading practices of road freight transport carriers, and the decisions of a road planning authority responsible both for road maintenance and for the enforcement of overloading control. At the lower (reactive) level, the overloading decisions of the carriers impact on road maintenance expenditure, while at the upper (anticipatory) level the planner decides fine and enforcement levels by anticipating the responses of the carriers. A case study using data from Mexico is used to illustrate the method.
INTRODUCTION
This paper will model the interaction of decision makers as actors in the freight transport system. In freight transport, the outcomes and impacts are influenced by many decisionmakers, though far fewer than in the case of passenger transport. In recognising the presence of multiple actors (Fisk, 1986) , a number of authors have turned their attention to an explicit representation of their behaviour, models being proposed with manufacturers, retailers and consumers as decision-makers (Nagurney et al, 2002; Nagurney & Toyasaki, 2005; Sheu et al, 2005; Figueiredo & Mayerle, 2008) and, more recently, third party logistics service providers (Panayides & So, 2005) . However, one special form of actor often overlooked is the government or planner, whose decisions regarding regulations and pricing will influence the decisions made by other decision makers, and who indeed may make pro-active decisions that anticipate such influences on other actors. There are relatively few authors that consider the decision-making process of a regulatory/government body responsible for addressing the societal impacts of decisions taken by other players. Exceptions to this remark include, for example, the work of Chang et al (2007) , who developed a decision-making tool for government agencies in planning for flood emergency logistics. Babcock & Sanderson (2006) investigated the impact on track and bridge maintenance costs of a change in policy to more economically efficient but heavier axle-load cars. Tzeng et al (2007) proposed an approach for planning relief delivery in the event of a major natural disaster, whereby the planner weighs up the potentially conflicting objectives.
In the present paper, part of a larger study, we shall focus on the particular issue of road maintenance costs and the impacts of vehicle overloading practices by freight transport carriers. Specifically, through a modelling approach, we examine the pro-active actions that may be taken by a planning authority responsible both for the recurrent maintenance of the roads and for the regulation of overloading, in order that (in the long-run equilibrium) the authority may cost-effectively and efficiently discharge its responsibilities on behalf of society. While this is an extremely important issue for policy-makers, articles on this topic appear relatively rarely in the formal academic literature, though this issue is evident in the wider, public-domain literature (ACSE, 2002; Dueker & Fischer, 2003; McKinnon, 2005; Knight et al, 2008; NVF, 2008) .
The paper begins in section 2 by establishing the significance of road damage due to overloading, and the potential for its mitigation by enforcement policies. Drawing on this evidence, we present in section 3 a mathematical modelling approach for the control of overloading, which respects the reactive nature of the carriers' decisions while allowing the planner to adopt a higher level, anticipatory role when making strategic planning decisions. In sections 4 & 5, a case study based on Mexican data is used to illustrate the approach.
SIGNIFICANCE OF OVERLOADING, ROAD DAMAGE AND ENFORCEMENT
We begin our study by briefly examining the empirical evidence for the scale and impacts of the overloading problem for lorries (better known in some places as 'trucks'), and then move on to the role that existing enforcement procedures play. As a motivation for our subsequent modelling approach, we shall specifically examine the perspectives of the different 'actors' involved, in our case the carriers and planners.
From the road planner's viewpoint, overloading clearly generates serious impacts in the form of accelerated pavement wear and damage to bridges. Literature exists reporting both the prevalence of overloading practices and its resultant impacts. James et al (1987) and Harik et al (1990) both report on the effects of overloading on bridges in the USA. Specifically, Harik et al report on bridge failures from 1951 to 1988, where overweight lorries were recorded as the cause of total bridge collapse in 23 times out of 92 collapses. An OECD (1998) study across seven countries found up to 20% of vehicles to be overloaded in one of the participating countries (Finland) , and up to 10% of axles in two countries (Italy and Germany). Road maintenance decision-making in developing countries was examined by Klockow and Hofer (1991) and Martinez (2001) . In Mexico, overloading practices were recorded in a series of large-scale national surveys over the period 1991-2000 (Durán et al, 1996; Gutiérrez et al, 1999; Gutiérrez & Mendoza, 2000) . In the period 1991-1997 the most serious cases were seen to be articulated six-axle lorries, where average overloading percentages of between 45% and 74% were recorded.
There is therefore ample evidence of widespread overloading practices. It is consequently necessary to consider the impact on road wear. From the well-known American Association of State Highways Officials (AASHO) road experiments in 1958-60 emerged the theory of road damage from axle weight as an n th -power law, with n  4 (Highway Research Board, 1962; Small, Winston & Evans, 1989; Cole & Cebon, 1991; TRB, 2007 in tonnes. In operational terms, the damage factor represents the equivalent number of passes of one standard-axle that would produce the same wearing effect as one pass of the lorry (Urquhart and Rhodes, 1990) .
Although there has been debate concerning the appropriate value of the power in the equation for the damage factor (eg. Small et al, 1989) , it is undoubtedly the case that the functional dependence of the damage with respect to vehicle weight makes the road repair costs very sensitive to goods vehicle overloading practices. By way of illustration, Table 1 gives the damage factors of several typical UK vehicles and their loads, assuming a 4 th -power law. For example, by increasing from half to fully laden increases the damage factor more than fivefold for both a two-axle and a four-axle Heavy Goods Vehicle (HGV) would be offset by the $84 million that would be collected from weight regulation enforcement.
From the viewpoint of the carriers, there is evidence that fine levels are too low to eradicate overloading, and instead they consider fines as another operation cost, to be traded off against other costs involved (Euritt, 1987) . By way of illustration, Paxson & Glickert (1982) reported the effect of fine structures for three American states in the early 1980s, as indicated in Table   2 , where the weakness of the enforcement schemes is manifest. Two basic parameters define the efficacy of an enforcement scheme: a) the inspection effort and b) the level of the fine. The former determines the probability of catching offenders, which multiplied by the latter, gives the expected fine that an overloading violator will face.
The probability of catching violators varies from place to place, depending on the road network size and the resources available. For example, interviews with enforcement officials conducted by Paxson and Glickert (1982) gave estimates of apprehension probabilities of 5%, 20% and 15% for Tennessee, Indiana and Iowa respectively.
In conclusion, the interaction between the agentsthe planner and the carriersin the overloading issue is explained by each party aiming to minimise their own costs. The road planner is the proactive party, anticipating the carriers' reactions to the possible deterrent actions taken by the planner. To reduce overloading, the road planner implements a penalty scheme, determining a fine and a probability of detecting violators. Given the tonnes to lift and the trip distance, determined either by the market or by logistics needs, the carriersthe reactive partychoose the amount to load their vehicles, aiming to minimise the transportation cost including any expected fines to be paid. The fines collected from the remaining violators also partly offset the planner's expenditure on road maintenance, yet enforcement is itself a potentially expensive task, the cost of which must be balanced against its positive impacts in reducing road wear. In the remainder of this paper we aim systematically to capture these influences and potentially conflicting objectives of the carriers and planner, through a mathematical modelling approach.
BI-LEVEL MODELLING APPROACH TO OVERLOADING CONTROL

Problem formulation
The evidence presented in section 2 establishes the case for a strategic planning tool to assist the planner in making efficient, anticipatory decisions regarding the balance of effort devoted to loading enforcement and road repair costs. A strong theme running through section 2 was the presence of multiple objectives, the planner's primary interest in the costs of road maintenance and overloading enforcement, with some recompense available through fines collected, and the carriers' loading decisions being motivated by their own individual economic considerations, including vehicle operating costs, and the possibility of incurring fines for overloading. We thus need, as a minimum, a mathematical approach for dealing with problems with multiple objectives.
Looking to the literature, several potential mathematical approaches may be found for addressing such a problem, in related fields. Hu et al (2002) considered hazardous waste applications, proposing a problem in which government regulations were represented as constraints to a cost minimisation problem. In a similar technical spirit, Nozick (2001) considered generic facility location problems, where the objective is to minimise cost while satisfying some minimum level of service, with the desires of consumers (level of service)
represented as a constraint. Likewise, Jula et al (2005) considered optimal routing of container lorries including so-called 'social constraints', which are enforced by the carriers to ensure that drivers do not work beyond a certain amount of hours per shift. Chang et al (2007) proposed a stochastic programming problem with capacity constraints for emergency logistics planning. In contrast to the focus on constraints, Korpela et al (2001) adopted a weighted optimisation approach, with a single objective function optimized that balances customer service with environmental performance. Tzeng et al (2007) , on the other hand, avoided the need to pre-define weights, proposing a fuzzy logic-based, multi-objective optimization approach, whereby the planner weighs up the potentially conflicting objectives of minimising total cost, minimising total travel time and maximising minimal satisfaction.
The bi-level approach we propose to adopt is quite different to the above approaches, being neither based on (single level) multi-objective optimization nor on the representation of conflicting requirements as constraints. Past work in related fields that has relevance to our approach is now considered. Brotcorne et al (2000) adopted a bi-level programming approach to a freight tariff setting problem, where the 'leader'with an upper level objective of revenue maximisationis one among a group of competing carriers, and the 'follower' is a shipper with a lower level objective of minimising transportation cost. Kara & Verter (2004) also adopted a bi-level approach for selecting network links available to carriers of hazardous materials. In this problem, the 'regulator' minimises an upper level risk-based objective in terms of population exposure, and carriers at the lower level choose routes to minimise total transportation cost. Castelli et al (2004) proposed a bi-level linear program formulation of a two-player Stackelberg game between a 'shipper', minimising a lower level objective of transportation cost, and a traffic authority applying some form of regulation to an upper level objective which seeks to maximise the flow through the subset of links under the authority's control. In the same game-theoretic spirit, Nagurney et al (2002) and Nagurney & Toyasaki (2005) proposed a joint equilibrium model of three groups of non-cooperative actors, representing manufacturers, retailers and consumers.
For the problem considered in the present paper, we adopt a long-run equilibrium approach suitable for strategic planning, which is based on bi-level programming. We believe that such a bi-level formulation most closely reflects the decision-making hierarchy desired, in terms of allowing the planner to apply pro-active policy measures, as well as reflecting the differing levels of predictive ability available to the planner and the carriers. While it is reasonable to expect the planner to be able to anticipate the impact of loading enforcement measures on the carriers, it seems difficult to believe that individual shippers can anticipate the impacts of their loading decisions on the planner's policy. Thus, it is natural to associate the planner as a 'leader' and the carriers as 'followers', in game theoretic terms.
Thus it remains to set out the specific approach proposed to the overloading control problem.
The relevant lower and upper level objective functions are first defined in sections 3.2 and 3.3 respectively, before describing the overall bi-level programming approach in section 3.4.
Lower level objective: The carriers' objective
Based on the framework proposed, the main purpose of the lower level model is to describe the responses of freight carriers to changes in enforcement and fine levels. While there may in practice be a multitude of responses, we shall focus on the decision of how heavily carriers of a given class choose to load their vehicles. Such a focus, we believe, is justifiable taking into account the focus of the study, namely the impact of heavy axle loads on road damage. We do not, therefore, consider decisions such as routing of vehicles, perhaps to avoid likely locations of weigh-stations, or longer-term decisions for a carrier such as fleet composition. If such decisions are deemed important, then they could be accommodated within the modelling approach by some kind of hierarchical decision model.
We suppose that the product is of sufficiently high density that volume constraints of the vehicle are not a factor, even when significantly overloaded in weight. Therefore, as volume considerations are immaterial, we shall refer to the decision variable for the carriers as the load factor, defined as the ratio of the tonnes carried to vehicle capacity, given a specific commodity and vehicle type for transporting the load. Once the carrier knows the loads to move and the trip distance, the load factor chosen will determine the cost per Tkm (tonnekm). It is supposed that the carrier will not waste vehicle capacity, so the assumed load factor is at least one. Private carriers will try to minimise this cost per Tkm, as will for-hire carriers in order to improve the total trip profit. Now in the problem considered, there are many instances in which either the factors affecting the carriers' decisions or the factors affecting the planner's objective function may differ substantially between carriers (or even between different movements made by the same carrier). Examples of such factors include the payload capacity of the vehicle (offering the potential to overload), the axle configuration of the vehicle (impacting on the road damage effect of a given load), the suspension type of a vehicle (again affecting road damage impact), the operating costs/efficiency of particular vehicle types (affecting trade-off with fines), the commodity type (packaging shape, density, etc.) being transported (with volume and packing constraints/considerations affecting overloading potential and operating costs), the distribution of load over the axles affecting road-wear (varying by vehicle and commodity type), the distance the commodity must be transported (affecting the potential to detect overloading), and the pavement characteristics over which the commodity is transported (based on wear vulnerability).
While it may be desirable to reflect all such differences, in practice the availability and cost of collecting such data will inevitably limit the number of such dimensions for which the impacts may be distinguished. In order that the approach has maximum generality, and so can be tailored to the particular data availability of each case, the model proposed is developed around the notion of a class. Each class represents a particular combination of all the attribute dimensions that the modeller may wish to distinguish. Therefore, throughout the presentation of the model to follow, we shall define which attributes may vary by class, and allow the precise definition of a class to be made when any case study of the method is made (such as the one in sections 4 and 5).
Thus consider a carrier of a specific class k (k = 1,2,…K) moving k T tonnes (where T k is many times the capacity of a single lorry) over k d kilometres, and define: Then the expected cost for a carrier of class k, , is: k C 1 = vehicle operating cost + empty movements cost + expected fine.
In our model we shall assume that the penalty level for overloading is a sliding scale that is proportional to the amount of overload. Real systems will be discrete; even at their finest level they will only vary to the nearest penny/cent/dollar/pound. What we are doing in our model is an approximation to such a system. Our model will serve as a good approximation to the discrete system if there are many payment steps, but not so good if there are only one or two steps. In this latter case the method we have proposed could readily be used with a predefined step function replacing the linear function. Since in the end we propose examining fine levels on a discrete scale (see section 5.3), this change would make no material difference to the methodology. For simplicity, to be consistent with the strategic planning nature of the method we propose, we have decided to retain the simple assumption of a continuous sliding scale.
We are considering a case of bulk movement of materials, in which case the lorries will either be fully loaded, or overloaded. Since the operation requires
vehicles, the expected cost for the carrier is thus:
which may be simplified slightly to:
The probability k p in equation (2) naturally depends on the number of inspection points the planner places on the road network, but it also depends on the trip distance k d , since the longer the trip the greater the chance of finding an inspection point. The rationale behind this is that the planner, faced with a given fixed budget (total number of detectors for the road network), will assign detectors to roads in proportion to road-length; thus, for example, the planner is twice as likely to assign a detector to a 2 km stretch as a 1 km one, since the planner wants to minimise damage, which is linearly related to length.
Assuming a road network to be monitored for overloading that covers N kilometres in total and having w inspection points uniformly distributed across this network, the probability r of being detected on any one randomly-selected kilometre is N w r  . Hence, the probability of evading detection in one kilometre is 1  r, whilst the probability of evading detection along a full trip of d kilometres is (1  r) d , assuming independence between kilometre sections. So, the probability p of being detected in a d kilometre trip is:
Substituting this expression (3) into equation (2) gives:
Given the values of the fine level F and number of inspection points w determined by the planner, it is assumed that a class k carrier will search for the optimal load factor 
Upper level objective: The road planner's objective
The road repair costs result from the damage that lorries inflict on the road according to the load factor at which carriers choose to operate. For each class k, the damaging power is evaluated from the unit damage cost U (in monetary units per ESAL-km) and a function
estimating the resulting ESALs from the vehicle load factor k x . In this context, it should be recalled that the class k might reflect the vehicle type as well as the assumed distribution of the load and the suspension type for the lorry (though in the case-study reported in section 5, we shall take k to represent only vehicle type).
To control overloading, the planner must choose the number of inspection points w on the road and the imposition of a fine F in monetary units per tonne in excess of the legal limit. On the fine level F, it would seem sensible to impose an upper bound on the permissible values, since otherwise it may have negative economic impacts on the ability to trade and move goods. While the manning of inspection points has a cost for the planner, the resulting fine collection is an income that reduces total costs. So the expected cost to the planner is:
C road damage cost  total expected fines + cost of manning inspection points.
As previously in section 3.2, we consider a road network of a total length of N kilometres with w inspection points, and denote:
= ESALs function for class k, dependent on load factor k x S = cost of manning one inspection point.
As in section 3.2, the number of vehicles required to move k T tonnes a distance of k d
kilometres is
Then, for each vehicle of class k the road damage cost imposed is
and the expected fine for the excess tonnes is
giving the total expected cost for the planner as:
which simplifies to:
The bi-level carrier/planner interaction problem
Once the mutual influence of carriers' and planners' decisions is recognised, the planner's proactive character and his/her implicit authority to regulate road transport entitle this actor to play the leading part in this interaction. The planner, conceived in this proactive role, is assumed to know the possible reactions of carriers under diverse circumstances and thereby may anticipate them. The road planner may thus select some of his/her decision variables to induce the carriers' behaviour in the direction of meeting the planner's objectives.
We should stress at this point that the purpose of our approach is to find a kind of 'behavioural equilibrium', a stable point where the individual actors (planner and carriers) have no incentive to change their behaviour based on their individual objectives. This is very different from a global system-optimum where the costs and benefits to all actors appear in a single, weighted objective function, but where the solution may not be realisable or may be unstable.
In terms of the cost objective functions for the carrier and the planner described in equations (4) and (6) 
where it is assumed that M x is the maximal load factor that physically a lorry can stand (say, 3  M x may be a reasonable assumption), M F is the maximum politically acceptable fine level and M w is the maximal number of inspection points the planner is able to install.
It should be noted that this approach differs from the equilibrium resulting from a procedure whereby the planner starts by making a decision, then the carrier responds with his/her own decision, then the planner makes a subsequent move and so on, as would happen in a Nash non-cooperative game (see for example : Fisk, 1984) . The approach presented, rather than searching for a non-cooperative equilibrium under a series of planner-carrier decisions, develops the optimal solution instead by moving on the surface constraints that define the optimal decisions for the carrier under the choice possibilities of the planner. That is to say, there is a hierarchy in the decision-making. In this way, the road planner, able to predict any reaction of the carrier, will choose the most appropriate combination of number of inspection points and fine levels so as to get the minimal total expenditure (on repair and overloading inspection costs, less fine revenue).
Our purpose in constructing problem (7) is to define the potentially conflicting processes of planner and carrier, and with this in mind our way of applying this approach in the following two sections will be to explore and plot the objective function surfaces numerically. Our purpose in exploring the surfaces can be distinguished from an aim to devise efficient methods for computing bi-level optimum solutions. For the reader who may be interested in such algorithmic approaches, see, for example, Yang & Bell (2001) , where congestion leads to interdependencies in the travel choices, and where the resulting problem has the much more complex nature of an MPEC, Mathematical Program with Equilibrium Constraints (Luo, Pang and Ralph, 1996) .
CASE STUDY: OVERLOADING EVIDENCE FROM MEXICO
In 1991 the Mexican Secretariat of Communications and Transport (SCT) began conducting an annual road freight survey to collect data on lorries intercepted whilst using the paved road network. The main objective of this field study was to improve the knowledge of lorry traffic, since the usual sources arising from invoices, permits and taxes could not give information about local traffic, seasonal variations in flows, or overloading (Rico et al, 1997) . The annual survey identifies the type of vehicle used, the size and weight of the vehicle sampled, the type of cargo moved, the origin and destination of movement, the kind of packing used, and the type of trade for the load (domestic or international). Information on overloading has emerged from these surveys, allowing a first look at the problem in Mexico based on actual data. From these surveys the five main vehicle types, representing nearly 97% of the fleet surveyed, were identified: rigid 2-axles, rigid 3-axles, articulated 5-axles, articulated 6-axles and double Maximum Maximum 1 9 9 5 1 9 9 6 1 9 9 7 The degree of overloading for individual axles was also detected in these surveys. Table 4 displays the ratios of average weights on axles to maximum permitted axle weight of the five
Mexican lorry types, with data of 92113 vehicles recorded in 15 survey stations (Rascón et al, 1997) . Particularly noteworthy in these data are the remarkable average excesses of 16% and 43% for tractive double axle 2+3 and triple axle 4+5+6 in the articulated type T3S3, respectively. and in all the articulated types, represents the most common violation to axle load limits, whereas steering axle 1 represents the least common violation. This reflects variable load distribution along the lorry platform, which has almost no effect on axle 1, as compared to the rest of the axle groups. As background to these data, it should be noted that they occur in spite of weight enforcement, which is in place for lorries overloading both in GVW and in axle loads. Apart from vehicle detention and permit revocation for recidivists, violators face fines increasing with the degree of excess load. 
APPLICATION OF BI-LEVEL APPROACH TO MEXICO CASE STUDY
Context
In order to provide a clear example of the way in which our bi-level modelling approach could be applied, we shall consider a particular context for our Mexico case study network.
We suppose that there is a given total amount of some bulk commodity that needs to be moved over a portion of the road network; we assume that lorries are not currently carrying dense goods and so are not overloaded, thus the network currently has no inspection points for overloading control. We shall apply our method to the five lorry types introduced in section 4, assuming that market forces will lead all carriers to choose to run just a one of these lorry types for this bulk commodity.
Estimating ESALs and VOCs
In order to apply the modelling approach presented in problem (7) ESALs were estimated. By comparing the model fit of various functional forms to these data, the g functions illustrated in Figure 2 were selected. These particular g functions are based on a fourth order polynomial, for which the individual coefficients are of no interest as they are subject to multi-collinearity, a problem which does not affect predictions (which is the sole purpose we have for using these functions). From Figure 6 , the vehicles can be ordered in decreasing order of sensitivity of ESALs to the load factor, as: T3S2, T3S3, C3, T3S2R4 and C2. This suggests that for enforcement purposes, the most controlled vehicle type should be T3S2, followed by T3S3 and C3. Table 6) Based on these observations, VOC per Tkm functions ) (x V k were fitted for each vehicle type.
ESAL functions g(x). Five main Mexican Types
The general fitting equation used was:
The term x  in equation (8) reflects the reduction of average costs as fewer vehicles are required to move a given tonnage, whilst the quadratic term
reflects the increasing driving time and maintenance costs as load factors rise to the point at which the vehicle becomes unable to move (and the function becomes vertical). Table 6 displays the results of the statistical fitting exercise and Table 7 gives the results in equation form. These functions are illustrated in Figure 3 , and as can be seen the minima occur at different load factors for different lorry types. 
Solution Procedure
Our procedure for analysing optimisation problem (7) basically consists of constructing a picture of the complete upper-level surface over which the planner may search, when 'constrained' (mathematically) by the load-factor decisions that globally minimise the lower level problem at some given levels of enforcement. We shall then observe and interpret features of this surface. In order to do this we evaluate the upper level objective function 2 C at each of a grid of values for the number of weighing stations w and fine level F, when each x , at those values of w and F. An alternative approach would have been to utilise an optimisation algorithm to find local stationary points of the mixed-integer bi-level problem (7). Our approach, though less elegant, has the advantage that we are able to explore features of the surfaces of both planner and carriers, including the possibility for the existence of multiple stationary solutions, and to examine the trade-off between enforcement levels and maintenance costs for sub-optimal solutions.
Results and Policy Implications
In our model, the planner's ability to make a positive influence is highly determined by the responses induced in the carriers, and so it is a natural first step to understand the nature of this response (i.e. "the lower level problem" of (7) The VOC per Tkm functions used are those calculated in Both Figures 4 and 5 show that as more weighing stations are installed and higher levels of fine are set, the surfaces ultimately flatten so that the carrier chooses an optimal load factor as x* = 1, i.e. exactly the legal payload (where, it should be recalled, we assume that the cargo is dense enough for us to neglect volume constraints). On the other hand, there exist many plausible combinations of fine level and number of weigh stations at which overloading is an optimal decision to make for the planner, in spite of the fine; thus we are able to capture the realistic phenomenon of overloading observed in the surveys reported in section 4. Table 9 . Carrier's cost components at optimal solutions to the bi-level problem Tables 8 and 9 are inter-linked, and so need to be carefully explained. We shall begin by focusing on just one row of each table, corresponding to vehicle type C3. Tables 8 and 9 indicate that (for this type C3) there is a region of optimal solutions to the bi-level problem, these optimal solutions occurring when (i) the number of inspection points is 17, and the fine level is at least 4420, and (ii) the carrier's LF (Load Factor) is 1.00. Since at such a solution no fines are being paid, then raising the fine level above 4420 adds no income to the planner and no cost to the carrier. On the other hand, at a fine level of at least 4420, increasing the number of inspection points beyond 17 would add cost for the planner, but would gain no reduction in damage cost because there is no overloading to deter, and therefore strategies involving more than 17 points could not be optimal. Turning attention to Table 9 , again just focusing on vehicle type C3, then we can see the total carrier's cost at the bi-level solutions, as well as the components of this cost (vehicle operating cost, empty running cost and fine cost). For this vehicle type, the policy implication is that the fine level and number of inspection points gives a sufficient deterrent to any overloading, and thus the fine cost is zero; however, this does not mean that the values of the fine level and number of inspection points are immaterial, since they are active in controlling the load factor.
Turning our attention to an alternative vehicle type, namely T3S2R4, we see a rather different kind of solution, and thereby different policy implications. In this case there is a unique solution to the bi-level problem (subject to the rounding used in the discretisation of fine levels). Looking at Table 9 , it is noticeable that this vehicle type requires significantly fewer lorries than other vehicle types; this is because this is a larger vehicle with a greater capacity, and because at the optimal solution the carriers are choosing to overload it (by 11%). In doing so, the carriers are choosing to accept a fine cost of 21323; if they chose not to overload, then they would incur a greater cost (in terms of operating and empty running cost) in needing more vehicles. However, it is important to appreciate when comparing the carrier's response for T3S2R4 with that for C3, we are not comparing their response at the same fine/inspection levels; it is the decisions of the planner that are effectively driving the differing decisions of the carrier regarding overloading. Looking now at Table 8 , we see for type T3S2R4 the same figure 21323 as income to the planner, which is sufficient to outweigh the road damage cost caused by the overloading. This solution is globally stable in the sense that neither carrier nor planner has any incentive to move from the solution shown, and there are incentives for any deviation from this solution to be reversed. Having chosen type T3S2R4, carriers have no incentive to choose a load factor of other than 1.11, and the planner has no incentive to change from having 11 inspection points (with continually changing locations) and a fine level of 4400. Should the carriers acquire any other type of lorry, the planner will increase the number of inspection points (as per Table 8 ) and carriers will find themselves with higher costs than if using type T3S2R4, even with the additional inspection points (not shown), and market forces will dictate a change to using type T3S2R4. This example illustrates the benefits of our approach, in being able to suggest an optimal policy for the planner while handling the complexity of these interactions between the different decision-makers.
A final interesting implication of this case study may be seen by comparing all five lorry types in Tables 8 and 9 . From these tables, the lorry type giving the smallest optimal planner cost is 43227 for type T3S2R4, and in fact in this example this type also gives the smallest optimal carrier cost (of 274064). Therefore, if the carrier has the choice of which type of lorry to operate, which is what we would expect in the long run, then it is optimal for both the planner and carrier for this load to be transported by vehicles of type T3S2R4. It should be noted that the fact that planner and carrier objectives would pull in the same direction is not a necessary condition (in contrast with system optimization methods, for example; Crainic et al, 1990 ), but rather is an outcome of applying our method to this case-study.
CONCLUDING REMARKS
This paper has extended the methods for modelling multi-actor, multi-level modelling approaches in freight transport (Nagurney et al, 2002; Nagurney & Toyasaki, 2005) which consider manufacturers, retailers and consumers as decision-makersto take into account the objective of a planner who aims for a societal optimum by minimising expenditure on road maintenance costs though overloading control. The main contributions of this paper to the literature are as follows:
 A novel modelling approach has been developed in order to explicitly represent the decision-making process of the planner aiming for a societal optimum through a hierarchical, bi-level approach. This approach explicitly separates the objectives of planners and carriers, representing the anticipatory power of the planning authority as a 'leader'. This may be contrasted with previous methodological approaches to problems of a similar structure in freight transport, which are limited by the fact that they aim to incorporate conflicting objectives of the actors into a single level optimization problem, either by constraints (e.g. Hu et al, 2002; Nozick, 2001; Jula et al, 2005) , weighted optimization (e.g. Korpela et al, 2001) , or a (single-level) multiobjective optimization (Tzeng et al, 2007) .
 As a component of our modelling approach, we have developed functions to represent the objectives of planners and carriers and have related these to decisions each may selfishly make. This provides a more realistic alternative to the aggregate 'systemoptimal' methods (e.g. Crainic et al, 1990 ) of strategic freight transport planning, which aim to compute the potential benefits that would be theoretically attainable if all players conformed to the wishes of a central authority. Our bi-level method, in contrast, assumes that each player will act in their own best interest. As a result, our method produces an attainable optimum solution, rather than a theoretical optimum, as well as providing the policy measures that would lead to such an attainable optimum.
 We have demonstrated our approach with a case study of Mexico, with procedures described for calibrating the elements of our method, exploiting a variety of data sources on loading practices and road damage effects. The results of the case study are a contribution to the public policy literature on road planning and maintenance (Dueker & Fischer, 2003; McKinnon, 2005; Babcock & Sanderson, 2006; Knight et al, 2008) .
We believe that, in the future, the method proposed is easily generalisable, either with alternative model assumptions or applied to alternative planning contexts. For example, in terms of the specific model assumptions we have adopted, we may wish to model the impacts of variance in demand caused by variation about the (mean) long-run equilibrium value, or the feedback from an increase in carriers' costs to the quantity to be shipped (i.e. elastic demand). In terms of alternative planning contexts, the general approach might be applied to other kinds of externality. For example, building on Sathaye et al (2010) , we might consider extending our method to investigate optimal load factors considering the potentially conflicting objectives of minimising road maintenance impacts and minimising emissions. In this respect, the particular set of assumptions we have addressed in the present paper should be viewed as just one example of a variety of alternative (arguably more realistic) sets of assumptions that could have been made in place of those we chose. It is our intention to take the literature forward, rather than dissuade others from trying other variants in future. Indeed, we feel that these very possibilities, of taking what we have done further, are a large part of the value of the paper.
